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SECTION ONE
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
Richmond, Virginia - February 24, 1981

1.

John Doe filed an action at law against Bob Barrister
that Doe and Barrister were both residents of Williamsburg,
yirginia; that Doe had employed Barrister to prepare the estate tax
return for~_ the estate of Doe's father, of whom Doe was the sole
~~neficiary; that Barrister had failed to list in the tax return
~~rtain policies of insurance as a part of the assets of the dec2~ent 1 s estate, even though Barrister had been informed of their
existence; and that by reason thereof, Doe was obliged to pay penilties to the Internal Revenue Service in the amount of $6,000.
Doe had first contacted Barrister on June 5, 1977, and the tax
return was filed on July 3rd of that year. Doe's suit was instituted
~gainst Barrister on June 15, 1980.
a.~11eging

Barrister filed his grounds of defense, including a plea
bf the applicable statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.
The parties then engaged in extensive discovery procedures which
~arried through the fall and winter of 1980. In January of 1981
~oe realized that a specific bequest contained in his father's
will could have qualified for a charitable deduction against the
estate tax but it had not been so listed in the tax return, by
reason of which the estate was obliged to pay $2,500 more in estate
taxes than the law properly required. Doe also found that on Septem.ber 10, 1977, Barrister had failed to include a small parcel of
land in his preparation of a deed conveying to Doe certain real
estate which he had purchased. By reason of the foregoing, Doe
on January 20, 1981 petitioned the Court for leave (which was granted) to amend his motion for judgment to add two claims: (1) in
the amount of $2,500 for the additional taxes paid by reason of
~arrister's failure to prepare the estate tax return properly,
and (2) in the sum of $1,000 for the expenses to which he would
be put in obtaining a correction deed to remedy Barrister's error
ih the deed prepared in September of 1977. Barrister filed a plea
of the applicable statute of limitations as to each claim. How
should the Court rule on Barrister's plea of the statute of limitations as to (a) the claim for penalties stated in the original
complaint, (b) the amended claim relating to additional taxes,
and (c) the amended claim relating to the erroneous deed?

* * *
2. Glenda Graceful, an unmarried adult living in Staunton,
Virginia,. was struck by a car driven by another Staunton resident,
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William Wheels, while Glenda was walking across the street in front
of her home. Glenda was seriously injured and suffered a partial
permanent disability of her right ankle. Some six months after
the accident, Graceful filed a Motion for Judgment against Wheels
in the Circuit Court of the City of Staunton demanding damages
in the amount of $75,000. Wheels filed his Grounds of Defense denying negligence on his part and affirmatively charging Glenda with
fOntributory negligence.
~·
The case was tried to a jury and at the conclusion of Glenda's
evidence, Wheels moved the Court to strike the plaintiff's evidence
And enter judgment on behalf of the defendant. This motion was
~verruled by the trial court~ Wheels then put on his evidence,
~nd the parties rested. Counsel then met with the Court to review
~the tendered jury instructions, and seven instructions were granted
~y the Court as to which Wheels voiced strenuous objection to two,
dictating the grounds of his exceptions into the record. Thereafter,
the jury retired and rendered a verdict of $42,500 for the plaintiff. Judgment was, accordingly, entered on the verdict.

The next day the defendant, Wheels, filed a motion to set
.aside the verdict as being contrary to law and evidence and based
~on improper instructions. The plaintiff objected to defendant's
.motion on two grounds: (a) that the Court had already ruled on
the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence and the instructions and
.its decision on those aspects of the trial was final; and (b) that
the defendant was estopped from any further challenge as to the
$Ufficiency of the evidence as he had chosen to rely on a motion
to strike at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence.
How should the Court rule on each ground of plaintiff's objections to defendant's motion?

* * *
3. Bob Bundy, a resident of Hopewell, Virginia, made an
application for a loan at the Twin Cities Savings and Loan Association, a Virginia corporation, located between Petersburg and Hopewell, Virginia. Included in the settlement papers was a form, required by the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1601,
under which the borrower was required to indicate whether he desired
$15,000 in credit life, accident, health or loss of income insurance. Although the Truth in Lending Act did not require the issuance
of the policy, the Savings and Loan Association agreed to obtain
the policy at the request and at the expense of the borrower. Bundy
requested such coverage and the loan was closed. Shortly thereafter,
Bundy was struck by a car and killed. His wife, Mildred, who qualified as executrix of his estate, inquired of the Savings and Loan
Association as to the steps she would have to take to apply for
the benefits of the insurance policy, only to be told that no coverage had, in fact, been obtained.
After consultation with her attorney, Mrs. Bundy filed suit
in the United States District Court in Richmond seeking damages
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in the amount of $15,000 as a result of the failure of the Savings
and Loan Association to procure the insurance for which Bob Bundy
bad applied. The Savings and Loan Association filed a motion to
1 dismiss
for want of jurisdiction. Did the Court have jurisdiction?

4. William ·Whitby was tried before a jury in the Circuit
Court of Virginia Beach on a charge of armed robbery. The evidence
against him was based on an identification of Whitby by the victim,
Walter Wallaby, first made in police headquarters while Whitby
was standing in a small room in the custody of two police officers.
At the trial, Whitby's attorney made no objection to the admissi~ility of Wallaby's testimony when Wallaby again identified Whitby
as the man who robbed him. At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's
evidence, Whitby's counsel moved to strike the Commonwealth's evi"ence on the ground that the in-court identification resulted from
~ah "unconstitutional lineup or identification procedure" conducted
~t police headquarters in the absence of counsel and under very
~uggestive circumstances. How should the Court rule on Whitby's
;motion to strike?
·k

* *

5. In a chancery suit commenced in the Circuit Court of
?Augusta County, Virginia, the court heard the evidence ore tenus.
1
Upon the conclusion of the evidence, and after hearing argument
~of counsel, the court entered an interlocutory order adjudicating
~ertain matters, and retained the cause upon the docket for further
}proceedings that were deemed necessary before a final decree could
.~e entered. Before a final decree was entered the lawyer for the
.~efendant in the suit concluded that the court had misconstrued
~he law and had thus committed error in entering the interlocutory
torder. Also, following the entry of the interlocutory order, the
Jde:fendant advised his lawyer that he had, for the first time, learn·~£ new and material evidence that might well alter the finding
~pon which the interlocutory order was based.
What, if anything, may the lawyer for the defendant do, prior
to the entry of the final decree, in an effort to correct what
.were considered to be errors of law in the judgment of the court,
and to secure findings of fact favorable to the defendant?
·

* * *
6. Solicitor, an attorney practicing law in West Virginia,
addressed a letter to Barrister, an attorney practicing law in
1Richmond, Virginia. In that lett~r Solicitor advised that his client
had some claims against a Virginia resident living in Richmond
rthat would have to be asserted in a court of equity in Virginia,
Snd he requested Barrister to be associated with him in representing
his client. In the letter Solicitor inquired of Barrister: (a)
how a suit in equity is commenced in Virginia; (b) if a defendant
~ecides to file a motion to quash process or a motion challenging

PAGE FOUR
necessary that this be done upon a special appearance;
• c) if the motion to quash process is filed and overruled, when
must defendant answer the bill of complaint, and if a motion to
buash is not filed, when must an answer be filed by the defendant;
d) if defendant decides to file a cross-bill, within what time
ust it be filed; and (c) if a cross-bill is filed by the defendant
gainst the plaintiff, within what period of time must responsive
leadings be filed by the plaintiff.
What response should Barrister make to the inquiries directed
y the letter?

7. Al Sport, an antique car buff living in Norfolk, Virginia,
as interested in purchasing a Duesenberg Roadster.owned by Sam
echanic, a resident of Roanoke, Virginia. On April 17, 1980, Sport
ddressed a letter to his friend, John Cook; in Roanoke, with a
ppy to Mechanic, requesting Cook to represent him as his agent
n purchasing the antique Duesenberg. Sport offered to pay Cook
or his services a fee of 10% of the purchase price .. With the letter
o Cook, Sport enclosed a proposed written contract, q(-:safe with
he purchase price being left blank. The proposed cdrit;'ract was
igned by Sport at the time it was mailed to Cook •. 'l)Jq\days, after
ook and Mechanic received the letter from Sport,- CoOk: received
telegram from Sport instructing him not to purchase'die···car and
o return the proposed contract to him. On the same diY that the
elegram was sent to Cook, Sport addressed and posted ~ letter to
echanic advising him that he was no longer interested in purchasing
he car, and that he had cancelled Cook's authority to act in his
ehalf. After Cook had received the telegram, he immediately preented the written contract, which included the amount of the purhase price, to Mechanic who signed it and delivered it back to
ook. The contract provided that the car would be delivered to
port five days after the signing of the contract. A few hours
fter Mechanic signed the contract, he received the letter sent
~him by Sport terminating Cook's authority to act for him as
is agent. Mechanic consults you inquiring whether the contract
s binding upon Sport.
What would you adivse?

;': * ;"

8.
Chuck Clearcut purchased some unfenced timber land in
Botetourt County, Virginia. Before purchasing the land the owner
took Clearcut on the property and showed him what he claimed were
he boundary lines. The deed conveying the property to Clearcut
escribed the property as containing 2,500 acres. A survey would
ave revealed that there were actually only 2,000 acres in the
roperty he had purchased; however, Clearcut did not have the property surveyed. Believing that he owned the entire 2,500 acres described in the deed and within the boundary lines shown to him
by the seller, he immediately moved his crews onto the land and
,cut all the timber on the 2,500 acres~ which included 500 acres
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belonging to Dan Derelict. After cutting the timber, Clearcut had
it milled into finished lumber of various grades, which he comingled with his other existing inventory. The value of Derelict's
timber on the stump at the time of the cutting was $20,000, and
~he value of the finished lumber milled from .Derelict's trees had
a total value of $100,000.
~

Derelict went to his property to go hunting and discovered
'learcut' s timber crews had cut his trees. Derelict immediately
onfronted Clearcut and demanded that he be paid $100,000 for the
irnber which had been cut. When shown Derelict's deed, Clearcut
drnitted his mistake in cutting Derelict's trees and offered to
ay him $20,000 for the trees, the admitted fair market value of
he standing trees.

Before accepting Clearcut's offer, Derelict consulted his
ttorney as to what rights, if any, he may have in the lumber produced from his trees.
What should his attorney adivse him?

9. On April 1, 1979, Sam Spendthrift and Sally Spendthrift,
his wife, executed a general deed of assignment by which theTconveyed to Torn Terry, trustee, all their assets, both real and p~r
sonal, for the benefit of all their creditors. Included in the
properties conveyed was Blackacre, a tract of land containing 600
ftcres, upon which the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, the only
lien creditor, held a first deed of trust securing a debt to the
~ank with an unpaid balance of $10,250. The deed to Terry provided
~hat he should convert all. the property conveyed to him to cash
as soon as possible and that "upon the conversion [the trustee
~hall] pay all taxes and all claims having priority by reason of any
valid lien securing the same and the residue of the fund corning into
~he hands of said trustee shall be distributed by him prorata to and
among the creditors above named".
On April 28, 1979 Terry filed a bill of complaint in the
,Circuit Court of Greensville County in which he made the Spend. thrifts, the Bank and all other creditors parties defendant and
by which he sought direction and guidance in the administration
of the trust. The Bank answered the complaint by stating that it
.had no objection to the sale of Blackacre even though debt to it
~was not yet due.
Pursuant to an order of the court, the trustee, Tom Terry,
sold all the property, including Blackacre, free and clear of all
liens~ Blackacre was sold for $8,250 and all other assets were
sold for $10,500 - a total of $18,750. The total amount of the
debts of all creditors other than the Bank was in excess of $10,500.
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Charles Carter, the special commissioner to whom the matter
was referred for a report on the scheme of distribution of the
proceeds of the sales, reported that because of the lien the Bank
had on Blackacre it was entitled to receive the entire unpaid balance of its debt - that is, $10,250. The general creditors filed
exceptions to the commissioner's report in the Circuit Court of
~Greensville County in which they claimed that the Bank was entitled
to no priority, that it should be treated as a general creditor
and that the total proceeds from the sale - that is, $18,750 .should be applied prorata among all the creditors.
How should the court rule with respect to how the proceeds
the sale should be distributed?

* * *

~.; -.·,. "'. ·,
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10. By a final decree entered on Febr~ary 14, 1977 by the
.Circuit Court of Augusta County, Virginia, Lucy Lucky and Larry
Lucky, her husband, were divorced and Larry was ordered to pay
Lucy the sum of $1,000 per month as alimony. On February 14, 1978,
>Lucy married Harry Hustler. On March 18, 1978, Lucy.fil~d a bill
of complaint against Harry Hustler in the Circuit.Goµf"t:ofRock.ingham County, Virginia, seeking the annulment of li.~"J;:(riiarriage
to Harry on. the ground of Harry's fraud. 9n July 4:~;~;1~t2J§,>.that
court, by final decree, annulled the marriage on thetg:roun~ of
fraud and declared it to be "null, void and of no e.fJ.ect •..~~t

.:~if'.~):~~f~tJ~t?:·'.~ .:,_:~;/' ··:·\h-.~ >

Lucy seeks your advice whether she can obtairi'teinstatement
of the $1,000 alimony payment from Larry Lucky that had been terminated upon her marriage to Harry Hustler. What should you advise
>Lucy with respect to that question?

*
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